Comparison of the Theories of Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim on Religion

AbstractThis paper examines the whole works of Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim on religious mental picture, expression at how both idealogues essenti ally viewed religion as serving an inherent role in charitable culture. In particular, this essay considers how both theorist consider religious believers to be mistaken in their ontological beliefs, and the thinking(prenominal) grammatical cases for this.IntroductionWhile both Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim ar concerned with the study of human behaviour as it relates to culture, severally does so from inwardly plain traditions. In terms of religion, Freuds approach belongs to the mental tradition, while Durkheim puts forward a sociological approach. In the Freudian view, human behaviour is largely operate by inborn and intangible drives, working in the unconscious. Such phenomena atomic number 18 not coverly observable, that is, they be non-empirical they must consequently be inferred, and as such atomic number 1 8 conjectural. Durkheims sociological method, on the other hand, utilises direct empirical observations of social phenomena (rites, rituals, customs, et cetera), looking to news report for the impetus stub and decision of group behaviour. thusly Freud is concerned with obscure, intangible internal phenomena, whereas Durkheim is concerned with undefendable and tangible external phenomena. Evidently, the theoretical positions in question to a story divide between internal and external motivations.Different Routes to the Core of a DelusionDurkheim posits a direct connection between environmental variables, the expression groups interact with such variables, and how this interaction is perceived by idiosyncratic members of give tongue to group. There is a mode of cyclical reflexivity in this projectile this instrument people living together in society come back rules which are felt by any individual member as acting on him from outside, as having a force which he feels as bot h uplifting and constraining (Scharf 1970, 151). This force, Durkheim argues, is an externalisation of conventions peculiar to the group that are perceived as exogenous but which are in occurrence endogenous. This tendency to externalise, Durkheim suggests, derives from the natural human desire to ascribe meaning to experience, to desire a pattern in the natural order. Thus, as Kunin states, religion too is an externalisation of society and its order and speaks to the dialectic relationship between the individual and society (2003, 82). Religion, then, provides for an externalised object onto which collective emotion can be project this is ultimately reflexive because the externalisation at root represents the people themselves. As a result, to honour religious custom is indirectly to honour the group. This is why for Durkheim religious experience serves to strengthen group cohesion and bonding. Freuds sympathy of religion is somewhat pejorative. Connolly observes that Freud noti ced the connection between abnormal psychological conditions and religion (1991, 146) which observation he expanded upon in his study obsessive acts and ghostly Practices (1907). As the papers title suggests, Freud drew a connection between psychological abnormality and religious practice, noting a parity between what are called obsessive acts in neurotics and those religious observances by means of which the faithful give expression to their piety (17). In turn, Freud perceived religion, uniform neuroticism, as symptomatic of deep-seated psychological issues. In the words of Gallucci, Freud power saw religion as a collective neurotic symptom, an obsessional neurosis (2001, 76). This neurosis, according to psychoanalytic possibleness, comes about as a defensive measure mechanism against feelings of facilitate slightness which obtain in a dispassionate cosmos. Hence the need for a cosmic father figure, who, as a parent comforts the child, palliates the religious subject wit h conciliatory notions (about direct, meaning, boundaries, rewards, and so on). This entire energizing apparently stems from Oedipal anxieties, where each person grows up with a sense of prognosticate toward a father figure who is both feared and loved this, it follows, becomes the terra firma for the cosmic father figure, who offers protection and salvation but in the meantime unavoidably to be appeased by devotion and sacrifice (Clarke 2002, 43). In Freuds mind, religion therefore constitutes a surrogate parent. On the surface, Freud and Durkheim proffer two plainly quite dissimilar explanations for religion. Importantly, while these theories are not overtly complementary, nor are they mutually exclusive. Indeed, significant parallels may be drawn between each approach. For example, both both theorists argued that religion is an important factor in community of interests cohesion (Scharf 1970, 155) both agree that religion is central to any pagan analysis (Ginsburg and P ardes 2006, 220) and, thus, both hold that that the cognitive roots of religious belief are to be found in social experience (Spiro 1987, 202). These similarities are significant and, moreover, point to whizz common determinant that the underlying basis of religious convictions are contrary to what believers suppose. For Durkheim, the real driving force behind religion is social cohesion for Freud, the impetus is psychological assuagement. In each case, social unity and mental wellbeing obtain, precisely for slightly different conceptual reasons. From the above, one might argue that Freud and Durkheim share significant overarching perspectives on religion while holding markedly different structural viewpoints on how and why religion functions. Freud is concerned with psychological structures Durkheim with sociological structures. Freud believes religion works to console believers from the ultimate anxiety of a meaningless cosmos. Durkheim believes religion provides for a canvas o n which social phenomena can be externalised and then re-accommodated as an exogenous entity. Again, both modes of behaviour essentially work to the same conclude instilling a sense of meaning in human life. At this stage, one might consider the dashs in which Freudian theory could compensate for shortfalls in the work of Durkheim and vice versa. For instance, Durkheim offers little in the way of early psychological developmental insights, into the religious process yet there is no reason that early anxiety (of an Oedipal nature) could not cohere with Durkheimian ideas. Indeed, such anxiety and the consequent potential for neurosis could suggest an even great need for group cohesion as a way of reifying the guile through consensus, thus alleviating the anxiety. Again, this would chime with Durkheims understanding that religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things . . . which unite in one single moral community called a Church (cited in substant iate 2010, 39). By the same token, Freuds limitations could perhaps be overcome with character to some of Durkheims insights. Scharf notes a weakness of Freudian theory in that it does little to explain the variety in articulations of paternity and fraternity within religious discourse, advising that, here, Durkheims structural approach has more value (1970, 154). accordingly we see that a synthesis of theoretical approaches may not only be possible but highly advantageous.ConclusionFreud and Durkheim take really different roads to arrive at more or less the same destination. For this reason, significant and consistent core elements may be set between their works. These include the fundamental belief that religion serves an explicable, material, social purpose which is essentially external to theological concerns that religious believers are at al-Qaida mistaken in their beliefs (insomuch as these beliefs are connected to cosmic phenomena beyond the rationally explicable) that, it follows, religion is the irrational articulation of an ultimately rational cause (anxiety or clan behaviour) that religion can function as a surrogate or projection of humanity reformed with divine protection and that, finally, religion is an integral element of human culture. What is fundamentally different in these two authors is their methodological priorities. Each man comes from a very distinct tradition. Put simply, Freud and Durkheim were engaged in different disciplines as a result, their pursuits were oriented differently The reason Freud and Durkheims works are compared at all is that the realms of the sociological and of the psychological possess mutual territory the grounds of culture. both theorists have their limitations. Durkheim can be accused of being over subtractive and simplistic. Social structure may not be enough to account for every aspect of religion. Psychological, cognitive and other inborn factors may also have a large part to play. Freud, on the o ther hand, may place too much onus on the unconscious drives in dictating religious experience. After all, religion is so varied and complex, it might be argued, to defy any wholesale theory to explain it away. What, for example, do we bring up of religions in which there is no father figure proper or religions which proclaim no deity at allClearly there are unrequited questions on both sides of the aisle. Perhaps a hybrid methodology that adopt a syncretic approach to the study of religion might help answer these questions. After all, it seems to be the case that both Freud and Durkheim arrived at important insights into the social and psychological determinants that drive religion.ReferencesClarke, P. J. (2002) Explaining Philosophy and Ethics. Cheltenham Nelson Thomas.Connolly, P. (1991) Psychological Approaches. In Connolly, P. ed. Approaches to the look at of Religion. raw York Continuum, pp. 135-193.Durkheim, E. (1912). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. (J. Swain, T rans.) New York The Free Press.Freud, S. (1907) Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices. In J Strachey (ed. and trans.) Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological work of Sigmund Freud. London Hogarth Press.Gain, M., 2010. On Durkheims Rules of Sociological Method (Routledge Revivals). New York Routledge.Gallucci, G. M., 2001. Plato and Freud Statesmen of the Soul. 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